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When an appellate court goes out of its way to note, not once but twice,
that a defendant convicted of fraud and conspiracy was just twenty-two
years old and had only a high school degree when he joined a criminal
venture, it is probably a safe bet that a reversal is coming. That is exactly
what happened in United States v. Nora.1 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit overturned young Jonathon Nora’s conviction for his
part in a multi-million-dollar scheme to defraud Medicare. The case is, sadly
*
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1. United States v. Nora, 988 F.3d 823 (5th Cir. 2021).
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enough, nondescript as health care frauds go, except for one issue: mens rea.
The court’s decision muddles the law and has important implications for
prosecutors and defendants.
Nora arose from a home health care fraud scheme involving a company
called Abide Home Care Services.2 The scheme had two main components:
(1) Abide hired doctors to certify patients for unnecessary home health
services that the company then billed to Medicare, and (2) Abide paid
doctors and others for referrals to ensure a flow of patients to the company
for services, which it once again billed to Medicare.3 The evidence at trial
placed Nora, an Office Manager at Abide, in the middle of the scheme.4 He
funneled patients to his employer’s handpicked “house doctors,” who
approved them for services they did not need and were not eligible to
receive; tracked, processed, and delivered kickback payments for patient
referrals; and participated in “ghosting,” a practice designed to prevent the
Medicare program from detecting the fraud.5
After a 21-day trial, a jury found Nora guilty of conspiring to commit
health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, conspiring to pay and
receive kickbacks in exchange for patient referrals in violation of the AntiKickback Statute (AKS) 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2), and aiding and abetting
health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347.6 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence did not prove that Nora had
acted willfully, as the health care fraud and AKS statutes required.7 Because

2. Medicare’s home health benefit covers in-home services, like skilled nursing and physical
therapy, for homebound patients. A physician must certify that a patient is eligible to receive home
health care. 42 C.F.R. § 424.22(a). To be eligible, a patient must be confined to the home and the
services must be reasonable and necessary for the patient’s care. 42 U.S.C. § 1395n(a)(2)(A). The
process of certifying that a patient is homebound and needs skilled services often begins with a referral
from the patient’s primary care physician. See United States v. Barnes, 979 F.3d 283, 293 (5th Cir.
2020) (“Certifying a patient for home health care begins with an initial referral, which typically
originates with the patient’s primary care physician.”). Upon receiving a referral, a nurse visits the
patient’s home, completes an assessment, and develops a proposed care plan. United States v. Ganji,
880 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2018). A physician must review and approve the plan and submit it along
with other documentation to Medicare for a coverage determination. Because home health is supposed
to be short-term, Medicare pays for it in 60-day increments. After an initial 60-day period of care, a
physician must recertify that a patient needs home health services. 42 C.F.R. § 424.22(b).
Recertification is required every 60 days thereafter to extend the benefit. Id.
3. Nora, 988 F.3d at 825–26.
4. Id. at 826.
5. Id. at 826–28.
6. Id. at 825.
7. Id. at 834.
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the government failed to meet the statutory mens rea elements for the charged
offenses, the court overturned Nora’s conviction and vacated his sentence.8
This Article focuses on Nora’s implications for proving willfulness in
kickback cases.9 The court reversed Nora’s conviction because the
government did not establish that he acted willfully—that is, that he “knew
that Abide’s referral payments constituted illegal kickbacks.”10 To
demonstrate willfulness after Nora, the government must show that a
defendant knows that referral payments are illegal kickbacks and intends to
make them anyway.11 This holding is problematic for three reasons:
•

First, it contradicts Fifth Circuit precedent that held the opposite.12
The court overlooked United States v. St. Junius,13 which held that
willfulness does not require the defendant to know that the payments
are illegal kickbacks.14 The panel that decided Nora neither cited nor
distinguished St. Junius.

•

Second, the court did not adequately consider the 2010 amendment
of the AKS, which provides that “a person need not have actual
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of
this section.”15 By adding this clause, Congress clarified the statute’s
mens rea element.16 While the Fifth Circuit mentioned the
amendment, it did not reconcile its holding with the new statutory
language.

•

Third, the court articulated a willfulness standard that is more
demanding than either St. Junius or the amended AKS, leaving

8. Id.
9. Although this Article emphasizes kickbacks, the federal health care fraud statute also requires
willful conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (criminalizing knowing and willful schemes to defraud federal
health care programs). Federal prosecutors often pair kickback and health care fraud charges, so this
Article may be pertinent beyond its consideration of the mens rea required under the AKS. See also
Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Toward a Specific Intent Requirement in White Collar Crime Statutes: How the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Sheds Light on the “General Intent Revolution”, 64 FLA. L. REV. 449,
459 (2012) (recognizing that the federal government has several statutory options for prosecuting
health care crimes, including the health care fraud statute and the AKS).
10. Nora, 988 F.3d at 834.
11. Id. at 827.
12. United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 210 (5th Cir. 2013).
13. United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2013).
14. Id. at 210.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h).
16. Id.
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prosecutors without clear guidance about the mens rea needed to
charge and prove kickback offenses. The decision reinvigorates
ignorance of the law as a defense to accountability.
Nora represents a missed opportunity. Instead of clarifying the meaning
of willfulness, it prolongs uncertainty, at least in the Fifth Circuit. To
understand why, one must look to history. Section I of this Article
summarizes key willfulness jurisprudence prior to 2010. Three different
formulations of willfulness emerged historically, leading to disparate
standards for proving whether defendants in kickback cases acted with the
requisite criminal intent. In 2010, Congress stepped in to clarify the mens rea
required under the AKS. Section II explains how Congress modified the
statute. Section III focuses on willfulness after the 2010 amendment,
primarily by contrasting the decisions in St. Junius and Nora. Section IV
reflects on Nora’s implications for proving willfulness in future kickback
cases in the Fifth Circuit.17
I. THE AKS AND WILLFULNESS PRIOR TO 2010
The AKS prohibits giving and taking payments in exchange for referring
patients for services that will be reimbursed by a federal health care program,
like Medicare.18 The statute criminalizes “knowingly and willfully” offering,
paying, soliciting, or receiving “any remuneration (including any kickback,
bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind”

17. This Article concentrates on Nora and its portents in the Fifth Circuit, but the problem it
confronts—ambiguity in the meaning and application of the term willfully in criminal statutes, like the
AKS—is not confined to a single circuit. This problem is decades-old with a venerable pedigree in the
circuits and Supreme Court. It is not peculiar to the Fifth Circuit, nor will it remain confined there.
Indeed, advocates have already begun deploying Nora’s restrictive holding outside the Fifth Circuit.
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 16-cr-10343-ADB, 2021 WL 1210356, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Mar. 3,
2021) (involving a defendant in the District of Massachusetts who relied on Nora as the basis for
seeking her release pending appeal to the First Circuit).
18. Commentators sometimes call the AKS the “Medicare” anti-kickback statute. See, e.g.,
Andrea Tuwiner Vavonese, The Medicare Anti-Kickback Provision of the Social Security Act—Is Ignorance of
the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 943, 944 n.4
(1996) (referencing “the Medicare anti-kickback statute”). That moniker is no longer apt. The AKS
applies to all “[f]ederal health care programs,” a term that, in addition to Medicare, includes Medicaid,
which covers children, pregnant women, elderly and low-income adults, and people with disabilities;
TRICARE, which covers uniformed service members, retirees, and their families; the Federal
Employees’ Compensation Act program, which covers injured federal workers; and other federally
funded and designated initiatives. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f) (defining federal health care program).
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to induce patient referrals or in exchange for making them.19 A person who
violates the AKS commits a felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison,
a fine up to $100,000, or both.20 The statute’s criminal penalties are stiff
because kickbacks have a pernicious impact on health care.21
“Kickbacks can distort medical decision-making” and impair physician
judgment.22 They transform patients into revenue-generating opportunities
and drive overutilization that depletes limited health care resources.23
When money dictates medical care, patients may suffer.24 A physician who
allows bribes and pecuniary inducements to control a patient’s course of
care tramples the patient’s dignity and may expose the patient to the risk of
unnecessary treatment.25 Whether a patient needs a test, procedure, or
medication should be determined by unconflicted clinical judgment, not by
the fact that the referring physician receives cash under the table, a trip to
Las Vegas, or in-kind perks. The AKS tries to purge this sort of financial
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)–(2).
20. Id.
21. Kickbacks are actionable civilly and administratively as well. A claim submitted to a federal
health care program for reimbursement that is tainted by a kickback is considered false or fraudulent
under the False Claims Act, which provides for treble damages and civil penalties. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(g) (confirming that claims arising from kickbacks constitute false or fraudulent claims under
the False Claims Act); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (imposing on persons who violate the False Claims Act a
“civil penalty . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains . . . .”). Violating
the AKS is also a basis for permissive administrative exclusion from federal health care programs.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (specifying the grounds on which the Secretary may exclude individuals
and entities from participation in federal health care programs).
22. Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert on Rental of Space in Physician Offices by Persons
or Entities to Which Physicians Refer, 65 Fed. Reg. 9,274, 9,275 (Feb. 24, 2000).
23. Id.
24. Id. (“Kickbacks can also adversely affect the quality of patient care by encouraging
physicians to order services or recommend supplies based on profit rather than the patients’ best
medical interests.”).
25. Dr. Farid Fata is an extreme example of a physician who demeaned patients by reducing
them to revenue generators. In September 2014, he pled guilty to perpetrating a massive health care
fraud in which he intentionally misdiagnosed and treated patients for cancers they did not have. Detroit
Area Doctor Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Providing Medically Unnecessary Chemotherapy to Patients, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (July 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/detroit-area-doctor-sentenced-45years-prison-providing-medically-unnecessary-chemotherapy [https://perma.cc/33KR-UABS]. After
needlessly poisoning more than 500 people, Dr. Fata referred some of them to hospice and home
health programs that paid him kickbacks. United States’ Sentencing Memorandum, United States v.
Fata, No. 13-cr-20600, 2015 WL 4160325, at *3, *30, *60, *75 (6th Cir. May 28, 2015). See generally U.S.
Att’ys Off. for the E.D. of Mich., U.S. v. Farid Fata: Court Docket 13-CR-20600, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/us-v-farid-fata-court-docket-13-cr-20600 [https://perma.cc/Y5
GH-YCNL] (providing factual details and subsequent procedural history following Dr. Fata’s guilty
plea).
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self-interest from medicine. The statute is a staple of health care fraud
enforcement.26 Thus, it is important to the government, health care
providers, and the entire medical field that the law’s prohibitions and
boundaries are as clear as possible.
Clarity is especially important for the statute’s intent element. To violate
the AKS, a defendant must act “knowingly and willfully.”27 Despite its
pervasive use in federal criminal laws,28 the term willfully is something of a
chameleon. The Supreme Court dubbed it “a word of many meanings.”29
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit called it
“notoriously slippery.”30 And lower federal courts put their own spin on
the term.31 Before 2010, when Congress amended the AKS, willfully had
at least three possible meanings in kickback cases.32
The first and broadest interpretation is that willfully means knowingly,
purposefully, deliberately, consciously, or intentionally.33 Willful conduct
contrasts with conduct that is ignorant, inadvertent, accidental, careless, or
unintentional.34 What matters under this interpretation is that the
defendant purposefully does the act that the law forbids, as opposed to
committing the act by mistake or neglect, under duress, or through coercion.
To prove a violation of the AKS using this broad willfulness standard, the
prosecution must show that the defendant deliberately offers or provides
26. See Fraud & Abuse Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR
GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/fraud-abuse-laws/ [https://perma.cc/
C36P-GYF2] (identifying the AKS as one of the five most important health care fraud and abuse laws).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
28. Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance,
48 DUKE L.J. 341, 414–27 (1998) (cataloging more than 160 federal statutes requiring some form of
willfulness).
29. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S.
492, 497 (1943)).
30. United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1998).
31. One observer suggests that federal courts have invented subjective ways of construing the
term willfully, producing “poorly reasoned” and “haphazard” jurisprudence in the process. Davies,
supra note 28, at 396.
32. Robb DeGraw, Note, Defining “Willful” Remuneration: How Bryan v. United States Affects the
Scienter Requirement of the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 271, 279–80 (2000).
33. Id.; see also United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting the traditional
definition of willfully is “consciousness of the act”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2), (8) (stating “[a]
requirement that an offense be committed [willfully] is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect
to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears”).
34. Vavonese, supra note 18, at 956–57; see also Jain, 93 F.3d at 440 (observing Congress added
“knowingly and willfully” to the AKS to prevent criminal sanctions from being imposed on a person
whose conduct was “inadvertent”).
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payments to induce patient referrals or intentionally requests or accepts
payments in return for referrals.35 Knowledge that the remuneration is
illegal, or that the AKS exists and proscribes pay-for-referral arrangements,
is immaterial.36 If the defendant deliberately makes or takes a bribe,
willfulness is satisfied.37 This interpretation precludes ignorance of the law
as a defense to criminal culpability.38
The second or intermediate interpretation requires more than
deliberateness or intentionality but less than actual knowledge of the AKS
and a specific intent to violate it.39 Under this interpretation, willfulness
refers to a “culpable state of mind.”40 A person must have a bad purpose
or act “with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”41 While a person
must know that paying for referrals is improper, the person need not know
that doing so violates the AKS.42 Proof of “knowledge of general illegality”
35. DeGraw, supra note 32, at 279 (explaining that, under the broadest reading, willfully means
“that the actions are intentional rather than accidental”).
36. Cf. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 209 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that
the law provides, “in many contexts, that ‘willfully’ refers to consciousness of the act but not to
consciousness that the act is unlawful”).
37. See Vavonese, supra note 18, at 957 (noting that “courts have interpreted the term knowingly
and willfully to mean only that one must intend his act and that knowledge of the illegality of the act is
not required”).
38. Id. (relating broad definitions of willfulness “support the well-founded maxim that
ignorance of the law is no excuse”); see also Davies, supra note 28, at 348–49 (discussing the expansion
of ignorance as a defense to crimes requiring willfulness).
39. DeGraw, supra note 32, at 288. DeGraw refers to the “middle” mens rea standard, whereas
this Article uses the term “intermediate.” Id. at 283. Middle can mean between, as in the mens rea standard
that is between a liberal reading and a heightened one; or it can mean mid-point, as in the standard that
is equidistant from the liberal and heightened standards. In either case, middle implies a singular
standard. Intermediate, in contrast, encompasses a range of things that exist between two ends. This
Article uses the term intermediate to clarify that the intermediate willfulness standard is not monolithic
but encompasses a range of comparable formulations and applications that are neither broad nor
stringent.
40. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998). Bryan involved a prosecution for dealing
firearms without a license. Even so, federal courts quickly began looking to the Supreme Court’s
construction of willfully in Bryan for guidance in evaluating the mens rea required under the AKS.
See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ompared to the licensing
provisions that the Bryan Court considered, such kickbacks are more clearly malum in se, rather than
malum prohibitum.”).
41. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)). In a
footnote, the Supreme Court collected different formulations of willfully in criminal cases, including
“stubbornly, obstinately, perversely,” for a “bad purpose,” “without justifiable excuse,” and “conduct
marked by careless disregard” for its propriety. Id. at 191 n.12.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (approving jury
instructions that did not require defendant to have knowledge of the specific law that criminalized his
conduct).
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suffices.43 Federal courts developed several formulations of this
intermediate standard. In United States v. Jain,44 for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that willfulness requires
evidence that a defendant “knew that his conduct was wrongful, rather than
proof that he knew it violated ‘a known legal duty.’”45 Thus, to prove
willfulness using the intermediate standard, the prosecution must show that
the defendant intentionally gives or takes kickbacks in exchange for patient
referrals and knows that doing so is unlawful.46
In United States v. Davis,47 the Fifth Circuit accepted the intermediate
willfulness standard for kickback cases.48 A jury convicted the defendant
of, among other things, two counts of offering and paying kickbacks.49 On
appeal, the defendant challenged the district court’s jury instructions,
arguing that the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on his good faith
43. Davies, supra note 28, at 386.
44. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
45. Id. at 441; see United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d
20, 33 (1st Cir. 1989) (approving a jury instruction that defined willfully as doing “something purposely,
with the intent to violate the law, to do something purposely that law forbids”). One district court
held that bribery “is not an innocent endeavor” but an “inherently wrongful activity,” implying that
taking bribes in return for patient referrals per se meets the willfulness element of the AKS. See United
States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting the wrongfulness of taking bribes in
exchange for referrals); DeGraw, supra note 32, at 285–87 (discussing Neufeld); see also United States v.
Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) (characterizing kickbacks as more malum in se than malum
prohibitum and observing that “giving or taking of kickbacks for medical referrals is hardly the sort of
activity a person might expect to be legal”).
46. The intermediate standard has its critics, including the late Justice Antonin Scalia. In his
dissent in Bryan, Justice Scalia pointed out the awkwardness of requiring general intent to do something
the law prohibits while not requiring knowledge of and specific intent to violate the criminal law at
issue. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 202–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The defendant in Bryan, Justice Scalia noted,
had to act with a bad purpose when he dealt firearms without a federal license, but did not have to
know of the licensing requirement or the law that made it a crime to sell guns without a license.
18 U.S.C. § 922. Justice Scalia, in effect, asked a basic question: what does the defendant have to know
generally to willfully violate a law? Would the defendant have acted willfully if he sold weapons without
a license knowing “that the car out of which he sold the guns was illegally double-parked”? Bryan,
524 U.S. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This would ostensibly involve a bad purpose (breaking the
parking laws to facilitate the sales). Would the knowledge that he was violating a law (instead of the
federal licensing law) be enough to establish willfulness? Justice Scalia’s dissent has at its core concern
about the ambiguous meaning of the term willfully. That ambiguity may be resolved either by adopting
a broad reading (i.e., willfulness requires deliberate action, as opposed to mistake or inadvertence;
knowledge of illegality is not necessary and ignorance is no defense) or a stringent reading
(i.e., willfulness requires knowledge of and specific intent to violate the law; ignorance is a defense).
The intermediate standard perpetuates ambiguity on Justice Scalia’s account.
47. United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir. 1998).
48. Id. at 1094.
49. Id.
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defense (he presumably wanted the court to tell the jury that his conduct
could not be knowing and willful under the AKS if the jury found that he
acted in good faith).50 The district court rejected the proposed instruction
and charged the jury that willfully “means that the act was committed
voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the
law.”51 The Fifth Circuit approved the district court’s definition and
affirmed the defendant’s conviction.52 Significantly, while the Fifth Circuit
required the defendant to know that his actions were wrongful, it did not
mandate that the defendant know of or specifically intend to violate the
AKS.53 This is what puts Davis in the intermediate camp.
The panel that decided Davis relied on United States v. Garcia.54 Garcia was
not a kickback case. It involved a prosecution based on a defendant’s
knowing and willful filing of false federal income tax returns.55 Even so,
the decision encapsulates the circuit’s thinking on willfulness and influenced
its later kickback jurisprudence. The district judge in Garcia charged the jury
as follows:
The word “willfully,” as that term has been used from time to time in these
instructions, means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely,
with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with
bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. Mere negligence, even
gross negligence, is not sufficient to establish willfulness.56

This formulation cuts a middle path between general intent (intent to do the
act) and specific intent (knowledge of the law and intent to violate it). The
Fifth Circuit’s kickback jurisprudence followed this intermediate approach
for years.57
The third and most stringent interpretation of willfulness requires that
the defendant know of the AKS and intend to violate it.58 This
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d, 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1985)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1985)).
55. United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1985).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 64 (5th Cir. 2013) (proposing a defendant must
intend “to do something the law forbids” (quoting United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d 1222, 1224
(5th Cir. 1985))).
58. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
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interpretation is an outlier that derives from a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Hanlester Network v. Shalala,59
the Ninth Circuit held a defendant must know that the AKS “prohibits
offering or paying remuneration to induce referrals” and must “engage in
prohibited conduct with the specific intent to disobey the law.”60
Willfulness does not exist absent actual knowledge and specific criminal
intent. Under this stringent mens rea requirement, ignorance of the law is a
complete defense to criminal culpability.61 To prove willfulness using this
standard, the prosecution, in effect, must (1) show a defendant knows that
the AKS criminalizes kickbacks and acts with specific intent to violate the
statute, and (2) overcome the defense that a defendant is ignorant of the
law, mistaken about what the law proscribes, or acts in good faith.62
These three standards—broad, intermediate, and stringent—represent
the variable approaches to construing the term willfully in the AKS that
emerged over the years. In 2010, however, Congress passed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and, with it, made several
changes to the laws governing health care fraud and abuse, including the
AKS.63 One of those changes clarified the statute’s mens rea element.
II. THE AKS, WILLFULNESS, AND THE ACA
To grasp how and why Congress amended the AKS in 2010, some more
history is in order. Congress passed the AKS in 1972 and has amended the
law several times since then. As first adopted, the AKS did not require
intent for kickback offenses.64 The statute simply made it a misdemeanor,
punishable by up to a year in prison and a fine not to exceed $10,000, to
solicit, offer, or receive a kickback, bribe, or rebate in connection with
services covered by Medicare or Medicaid.65 Congress fixed this omission
in 1980 when it modified the law to require knowing and willful conduct.66
After the 1980 amendment, the government had to prove that a defendant
59. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 1400.
61. Vavonese, supra note 18, at 975 (explaining that a stringent formulation of willfulness allows
for defenses based on ignorance, mistake, and good faith).
62. Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1400; Vavonese, supra note 18, at 975 & n.171.
63. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119,
759 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h)).
64. An Act to Amend the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329,
1419–20 (1972).
65. Id.
66. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat. 2599, 2625 (1980).
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acted knowingly and willfully to secure a conviction for offering, paying,
soliciting, or receiving kickbacks.67
The legislative history underlying the 1980 amendment provides a
glimpse into the law’s mens rea requirement. Because the statute lacked an
intent element, some in Congress were “concerned that criminal penalties
may be imposed under current law to an individual whose conduct, while
improper, was inadvertent.”68 Congress specified the requisite mens rea so
that “only persons who knowingly and willfully engage[d] in the proscribed
conduct could be subject to criminal sanctions.”69 This focus on preventing
inadvertent violations implies that a broad reading of willfulness is what
Congress envisioned when it amended the AKS in 1980. That is, Congress
arguably required willful conduct to ensure that a kickback defendant would
be convicted for deliberately, purposefully, or intentionally giving or taking
payments in exchange for patient referrals, not for inadvertent, coerced, or
non-volitional conduct that might unintentionally advance a kickback
scheme.70
Viewed against this historical backdrop, the interpretation of willfulness
that the Ninth Circuit adopted in Hanlester in 1995 frustrated the purpose
and constrained the reach of the AKS. By requiring the government to
prove that the defendant (1) knew that the AKS criminalized paying or
receiving kickbacks for referrals, and (2) specifically intended to violate the
statute by engaging in illegal conduct, the Ninth Circuit increased the
prosecutorial burden, solidified ignorance of the law as a defense in criminal
cases, and allowed actors who deliberately gave and took bribes to escape
67. Id.
68. H.R. Rep. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526,
5572.
69. Id.
70. An example may illuminate. Suppose employee D1 tracks the patient referrals to her
employer, calculates the amount due to each referral source, obtains the necessary cash, and hands the
cash out when referrers come around to collect. Under the broad standard described in the text, D1
acts willfully because she purposefully and of her own volition pays remuneration to induce and sustain
patient referrals. It does not matter whether D1 knows her conduct is illegal, as ignorance of the law
is no excuse. Contrast D1 with employee D2, who performs none of the activities described, except
that each week he receives from his boss envelopes to deliver to designated individuals. From D2’s
vantage, the individuals who receive the envelopes have a legitimate business relationship with his
employer and are due whatever they receive. Unless D2 has reason to know that the envelopes contain
payments as part of a cash-for-referral arrangement, his role in the scheme is at most inadvertent or
unconscious, and he does not behave willfully under the AKS. This example at least arguably embodies
the distinction that Congress drew in 1980 when it added knowingly and willfully to the AKS.
It wanted the law to capture D1’s conduct and insulate D2’s.
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accountability. The Hanlester formulation of willfulness did more than
prevent conviction of persons who mistakenly violated the AKS; it sheltered
wrongdoers. It also caused a rift within the federal courts about how to
interpret the term “willfully” in kickback cases.
While the Supreme Court often resolves circuit splits, in this instance,
Congress took control. In 2010, as part of the sprawling ACA legislation,
Congress amended the AKS by adding a new subsection, which reads:
(h) Actual knowledge or specific intent not required
With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this
section.71

New subsection (h) legislatively nullified Hanlester and clarified the statute’s
mens rea.72 The legislative history supports congressional intent to override
Hanlester. During the debate around the ACA’s health care fraud
enforcement provisions, Senator Ted Kaufman announced the following
on behalf of a cadre of Senators:
The bill also addresses confusion in the case law over the appropriate meaning
of “willful” conduct in health care fraud. Both the anti-kickback statute and
the health care fraud statute include the term “willfully.” In both contexts,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has read the term to require proof that the
defendant not only intended to engage in unlawful conduct, but also knew of
the particular law in question and intended to violate that particular law.
This heightened mental state requirement may be appropriate for criminal
violations of hyper-technical regulations, but it is inappropriate for these
crimes, which punish simple fraud. The Finance Committee health care
reform bill, America’s Healthy Future Act, addresses this problem for the antikickback statute, but not for the general health care fraud offense.
Accordingly, the Health Care Fraud Enforcement Act tracks the Finance bill
and clarifies that “willful conduct” in this context does not require proof that
the defendant had actual knowledge of the law in question or specific intent
71. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119,
759 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h)).
72. Cameron T. Norris, Reviving Hanlester Network: A Safe Harbor for Harmless Remunerations
Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 137, 146–47 (2014) (observing how “even
if the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation was correct at the time, it is certainly untenable today. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (‘PPACA’) amended the AKS to overrule Hanlester
Network”).
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to violate that law. As a result, health care fraudsters will not receive special
protection that they don’t deserve.73

Thus, after 2010, to prove that a defendant acts willfully, a prosecutor does
not have to show that a defendant knows that the AKS forbids kickbacks
or specifically intends to violate the statute.74 But the question remains:
what must a prosecutor prove to establish willfulness? The next section
takes up this question.75
III. THE AKS AND WILLFULNESS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AFTER 2010
The Fifth Circuit embraced the intermediate standard of willfulness in
Davis years before Congress amended the AKS in 2010 and nominally
followed that standard afterwards, with two important exceptions. While
the specific wording and application varied case-to-case, courts more or less
construed willfully to mean “the act was committed voluntarily and
purposely with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to
say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.”76 The two
exceptions to this trend occurred in St. Junius, which moved the law toward
a broad interpretation of willfulness,77 and Nora, which swung the law in
73. 155 CONG. REC. S10852-01, S10853 (2009) (statement of Sen. Kaufman for himself and
Sens. Leahy, Specter, Kohl, Schumer, and Klobuchar). Because the AKS and health care fraud statute
each require willfulness, Senator Kaufman addressed his comments to both laws. Id.
74. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. at 759 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(h)).
75. Several courts outside the Fifth Circuit addressed the impact of the 2010 amendment,
holding that it codifies the “majority view” of willfulness—what this Article calls the intermediate
interpretation. See United States v. Patel, 17 F. Supp. 3d 814, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (observing the
addition of subsection (h) to the AKS codifies the formulation of willfulness adopted by most federal
circuit courts prior to 2010); United States v. Ferrell, No. 11 CR 595, 2013 WL 2636108, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. June 12, 2013) (opining “[w]hen Congress amended the health care fraud and anti-kickback statutes
in 2010, it codified the majority view and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s position with respect to what is
required to prove a violation of § 1347 and the Anti-Kickback Statute”); see also United States v. Elhorr,
No. 13–20158, 2014 WL5666213, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2014) (concluding Congress sought to
minimize confusion about the meaning of “knowingly and willfully”); United States v. Mathur,
No. 2:11–cr–00312–MMD–PAL, 2012 WL 4742833, at *14–15 (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 2012).
76. United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 648 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Davis,
132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998)); see United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 64 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating
that a willful act is one committed “with the specific intent to do something the law forbids” (quoting
United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also United States v. Martinez,
921 F.3d 452, 467 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Cath. Health Initiatives, 312 F. Supp. 3d 584, 594
(S.D. Tex. 2018); cf. United States v. St. John, 625. F. App’x 661, 666 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(reciting the same willfulness test in a health care fraud case under 18 U.S.C. § 1347).
77. United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 210−11 (5th Cir. 2013).
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the opposite direction toward a stringent formulation.78 The consequence
of these diverging precedents, coupled with the ambiguity inherent in the
term willfulness itself, is that willfully remains “a word of many
meanings,”79 as dependent on the outcome a court wants to reach as the
written formulation of mens rea that the court articulates and professes to
follow.
A. Willfulness According to St. Junius
The St. Junius case arose out of a durable medical equipment (DME)
scam.80 Unable to enroll in Medicare as a DME provider due to his criminal
past, James Reese enlisted his stepdaughter, Lia Samira St. Junius, to serve
as his front.81 Together they opened a company called The Mobility Store
(TMS) under St. Junius’s name and enrolled the company as a Medicare
DME supplier.82 TMS embarked on a false billing scheme—e.g., billing for
items that patients did not request, need, or receive; billing for items that a
doctor did not prescribe; inflating prices—that cost Medicare and Medicaid
over $14 million.83 As part of the scheme, TMS used recruiters to steer
patients to the company.84 The recruiters worked at or had an affiliation
with third-party health care providers, which gave them access to patient
information that had value to TMS.85 In exchange for the patient referrals,
Reese, through his affiliated entities TMS and TRG,86 paid recruiters
commissions equal to “10% of the amount Medicare paid” TMS for items
provided to (or allegedly provided to) the patients that they had referred.87

78. United States v. Nora, 988 F.3d 823, 831 (5th Cir. 2021).
79. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S.
492, 497 (1943)).
80. DME refers to reusable equipment that beneficiaries need for a medical reason.
See 42 C.F.R. § 414.202 (defining durable medical equipment as equipment that “[c]an withstand
repeated use” and “[i]s primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose”). The term includes
everything from crutches to infusion pumps. Durable Medical Equipment (DME) Coverage,
MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/durable-medical-equipment-dme-coverage
[https://perma.cc/E7E2-MR5J].
81. St. Junius, 739 F.3d at 198.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 200.
84. Id. at 199.
85. Id.
86. “TRG and TMS ostensibly operated as the same entity, sharing employees and the same
office space in Houston, Texas.” Id. at 198.
87. Id. at 199.
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The commissions were kickbacks, and the government charged, tried, and
convicted two recruiters on multiple counts of violating the AKS.88
One of the recruiters, Martha Ramos, appealed and challenged her
conviction on the ground that the government did not establish that she
willfully violated the AKS.89 She argued that “she could not have willfully
violated the Anti-Kickback Statute because she did not know that engaging
in a commission-based pay arrangement with a Medicare provider was a
violation of the law,” and that the government failed to introduce “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew that being paid on commission
was illegal.”90 In other words, she contended that the government did not
meet the Fifth Circuit’s intermediate formulation of willfulness because it
could not prove that she acted with a bad purpose to commit acts she knew
to be unlawful.
The Fifth Circuit rejected her argument on the law at least three times.91
First, citing new subsection (h) of the AKS, the court held that the
government did not have to prove that Ramos knew of the AKS or intended
to violate it, but instead that she “willfully committed an act that violated the
[AKS].”92 The government’s burden was to show that Ramos willfully
solicited or received money in exchange for referring patients, not that she
knew that doing so was illegal.93 The court held that the government met
this burden.94
Second, the court acknowledged that the government introduced
evidence that Ramos was, in fact, aware of the AKS and knew taking
payments for patient referrals was illegal.95 Tellingly, however, the court
held “such proof was not required” and it was “unnecessary to sustain a
conviction.”96 All that mattered was that Ramos willfully referred patients
to TMS in exchange for commissions based on her referral volume and the
88. Id. at 200.
89. Id. at 209–10.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 210–12.
92. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. Ramos urged the Fifth Circuit to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s stringent construction of
willfulness in United States v. Dearing, 504 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2007), a case involving the federal health
care fraud statute, not the AKS. St. Junius, 739 F.3d at 210 n.19. The court declined her invitation and
once again rejected her argument that the government had to prove that she knew her conduct was
unlawful when she accepted commissions for referrals. Id.
95. St. Junius, 739 F.3d at 211.
96. Id.
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revenue it generated.97 Her awareness of the AKS and intent to violate it
were surplus.98
Third, at the close of trial, the prosecutor argued to the jury that “the
Government did not have to prove that Ramos knew that receiving
commission payments was illegal. Rather, the prosecutor argued, the
Government need only prove that Ramos knowingly received commission
payments.”99 Ramos challenged these remarks on appeal, asserting the
AKS “requires that the Government prove that she knew that receiving
commissions for referring patients was illegal.”100 The Fifth Circuit
rejected her argument for the third time.101 Calling Ramos’s interpretation
of willfulness “erroneous,” the court held the prosecutor had correctly
stated that law.102 The AKS, according to the Fifth Circuit, required a
knowing and willful act rather than knowledge that referrals for commission
payments were illegal.103
St. Junius is significant because it drifts away from the intermediate
standard of willfulness that the Fifth Circuit adopted in Davis and continued
to use in kickback cases thereafter. Instead of requiring “specific intent to
do something the law forbids”104—a formulation that presupposes some
awareness of the law and what it forbids—the court eased what it means to
act willfully in kickback cases. Knowledge and intention to do the act satisfy
the statute’s mens rea.105 Put differently, the court moved toward the broad
construction of willfulness sketched in Section I of this Article, which holds
that acting willfully means performing an action with purpose,
deliberateness, and consciously, rather than ignorantly, inadvertently,

97. Id.
98. Relatedly, Ramos argued that the trial court erred in admitting her personnel file, which
contained records reflecting her familiarity with the AKS. Id. at 211–12. The Fifth Circuit rebuffed
her argument as immaterial because the government did not need the evidence in her personnel file to
prevail, as it “was not required to prove that Ramos had actual knowledge of or a specific intent to
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute.” Id. at 212.
99. Id. at 211.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 210–11.
104. United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. St. Junius, 739 F.3d at 210 (stating “the Government is not required to prove actual
knowledge of the Anti-Kickback Statute or specific intent to violate it. Instead, the Government must
prove that the defendant willfully committed an act that violated the Anti-Kickback Statute”) (emphasis
added).
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accidentally, or under coercion or duress.106 At the very least, St. Junius
articulates an expansive interpretation of willfulness that tempers the
amount or type of knowledge that the government must evince in order to
prove that a defendant acts with the requisite mens rea. The case also negates
the ubiquitous defense among kickback defendants that they did not know
it was a crime to give or take remuneration for patient referrals.
B. Willfulness According to Nora
The jurisprudential pendulum swung in the other direction in Nora.107
In that case, the Fifth Circuit enunciated a stringent willfulness standard that
is more demanding than either St. Junius or the AKS itself.108
The fraud at issue in Nora emanated from Abide Home Care Services, a
Medicare home health agency.109 The company employed a handful of
physicians, called “house doctors,” who authorized and referred patients to
receive home health services at Abide.110 Abide, in turn, billed its services
to Medicare.111 This simple business arrangement belied a scheme to bilk
the Medicare program. Instead of certifying legitimate care plans for
Abide’s patients, the company’s house doctors authorized medically
unnecessary services to net Abide greater profit.112 Patients who did not
need skilled services and were not eligible for Medicare’s home health
benefit were approved for both because that is how Abide made money.113
When care plans were too simple and would not churn enough revenue,
Abide reworked them to increase the services or diagnostic complexity and
raise the anticipated reimbursement the company would reap.114
106. The Fifth Circuit has not advanced or developed this reading of St. Junius, nor has it broadly
construed willfulness in its wake. The decisions that cite St. Junius still hew to the intermediate standard.
See, e.g., United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 647–48 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing St. Junius but still requiring
proof of specific intent to do something the law forbids, in accordance with Davis). St. Junius is thus,
in some ways, an aberration. Even so, it remains good law and continues to be cited, within and
without the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Mallory, 988 F.3d 730, 738 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing
St. Junius for the proposition that commission payments to third parties may violate the AKS).
107. United States v. Nora, 988 F.3d 823, 831 (5th Cir. 2021) (agreeing with Nora that the
government did not prove Nora knew the payments were unlawful kickback payments) (emphasis
added).
108. Id. at 834.
109. Id. at 825.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 825–26.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 826.
114. Id.
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In addition to these billing frauds, Abide doled out kickbacks to its house
doctors and others to maintain steady patient flow.115 The company
disguised the sums it paid to house doctors (or, in one case, the spouse of a
house doctor) as compensation but, in actuality, the payments constituted
fees for patient referrals that violated the AKS.116 Abide also paid third
parties for referrals, including outside doctors, recruiters, and group home
operators.117 The company relied on this pay-for-referral system to find
new patients.118
Finally, Abide used a practice called “ghosting” to prevent Medicare from
detecting the scheme.119 Home health is a short-term benefit.120
Extended periods of enrollment may attract regulatory attention from
Medicare or federal law enforcement.121 To avoid this, Abide “ghosted”
its patients. The Fifth Circuit’s decision thoroughly described this practice:
Here’s how ghosting worked: once a patient had been in Abide’s system for
“a couple of years,” Abide would officially discharge the patient but informally
hold onto them, with the assigned nurses continuing to make home visits.
From the patient’s perspective, nothing had changed and thus the patient had
no incentive to leave Abide and seek home health services elsewhere. But
from Medicare’s perspective, this patient was no longer receiving services
from Abide. While a patient was being ghosted, Abide would not bill that
patient or charge Medicare. When Abide’s nurses would visit a ghosted
patient, instead of entering the visit data into Abide’s electronic record system
as was done for formal visits, the nurses submitted a paper note to record the
visit. After [sixty] days, the ghosted patient would be re-enrolled as an official
patient and Abide would resume billing Medicare.122

Ghosting kept Medicare’s regulatory gaze off Abide and prevented lengthy
periods of care from acting like red flags that might attract attention and
unravel the fraud.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also United States v. Barnes, 979 F.3d 283, 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2020) (resolving the
appeals of Nora’s co-defendants and describing how the company (1) used an employment agreement
to create a “paper trail” that hid kickbacks to a physician, and (2) increased the salary of a staff person
as recompense for the patient referrals her physician-husband made to Abide).
117. Nora, 988 F.3d at 826–27.
118. Id. at 827.
119. Id. at 828.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 826.
122. Id. at 828.
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The United States indicted twenty-three individuals, including Jonathon
Nora, in connection with Abide’s scheme.123 Those indicted included
Abide’s owner, house doctors, billing staff, and others.124 Following
several guilty pleas, Nora and five co-defendants (four physicians and one
biller) proceeded to trial, which spanned twenty-one days.125 The jury
convicted Nora for conspiring to commit health care fraud, conspiring to
pay and receive kickbacks in exchange for patient referrals in violation of
the AKS, and aiding and abetting health care fraud.126 The trial court
sentenced him to serve three concurrent forty-month prison terms,
followed by a year of supervised release, and ordered him to pay Medicare
almost $13 million in restitution.127 Nora appealed his conviction.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit twice described Nora as just twenty-two years
old with a high school diploma when he joined Abide in 2009.128 He began
full-time employment as a data-entry clerk earning $13 per hour.129 By
2012, however, Nora had worked his way up to Office Manager earning
$60,000 per year.130 He continued working at Abide as a salaried employee
until late March 2014, when the government investigation went overt.131
In his role as Office Manager, Nora performed several functions that
perpetuated the fraud. First, he handled patient intake.132 Nora obtained
Medicare coverage information, coordinated patient assessments, and
directed patients to Abide’s house doctors to approve home health
services.133 According to the court:
[W]hen a potential patient had her own doctor, but the doctor did not think
home health care was appropriate for that patient, Nora would follow up with
the patient to inform her of her doctor’s recommendation. Nora would also
tell these patients that they might still be eligible for home health care, but
that they would need to be evaluated by a different doctor. . . . Nora would
123. Id. at 826.
124. Id. at 825.
125. Id. at 826.
126. Id. at 825.
127. Id. at 829.
128. Id. at 826, 833. This description distinguished Nora from his more sophisticated
co-defendants, who had greater education, earned more than he did, and profited from the fraud.
In the court’s telling, Nora was the proverbial little fish in a big pond. Id.
129. Id. at 826.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 826–27.
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offer to assign the patient to one of Abide’s house doctors for a separate
evaluation of her eligibility.134

Steering patients to house doctors guaranteed approval and, with it, more
revenue.
Second, Nora tracked patient referrals.135 He logged where referrals
came from and “would inform the referrers that their referred patient had
been admitted and that they could thus receive compensation in return.”136
Nora also processed and delivered payments to referrers, including a group
home operator who testified when “she went to Abide to pick up her
referral payments, Nora would usually be the one to hand her the
checks.”137
Third, Nora participated in ghosting.138 When Abide’s owner
determined that patients needed to disappear from Medicare’s rolls for a
while, she sent a list of those patients to Nora, who in turn “helped make
scheduling changes to facilitate the practice.”139 Nora acted like a
clearinghouse, notifying the assigned nurses that their patients had been
ghosted and that visits should continue but with paper documentation
rather than electronic notations, presumably to avoid creating a digital trail
or mistakenly billing Medicare.140
Nora was, in short, situated at the administrative center of Abide’s home
health care fraud scheme, performing inherently suspect tasks.141 Even so,
the Fifth Circuit reversed his conviction for conspiring to pay kickbacks and
vacated his sentence because it determined that the evidence did not
establish that he acted willfully.142 The court’s decision is surprising on the
facts, but that is not why it is noteworthy.143 The decision is remarkable
134. Id. at 827.
135. Id. at 828.
136. Id. at 827.
137. Id. at 828.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting how “[t]aking
bribes for referrals is not an innocent endeavor”); United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir.
1998); DeGraw, supra note 32, at 287; see also Nora, 988 F.3d at 832 (conceding “[a]rguably, the
‘ghosting’ practice is inherently suspicious”).
142. The court reversed Nora’s convictions for health care fraud and conspiracy to commit
health care fraud for the same reason. Nora, 988 F.3d at 834.
143. Appellate courts review a “cold appellate record.” Nora, 988 F.3d at 829 (quoting United
States v. Nicholson, 961 F.3d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 2020)). Juries benefit from hearing, seeing, and
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because of how the court formulated and applied the term willfully. The
Fifth Circuit did not mention St. Junius, barely mentioned the 2010 statutory
amendment of the AKS, and articulated a stringent account of willfulness
that confounds the law in kickback cases.
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis of willfulness by quoting the circuit’s
traditional intermediate formulation: “Willfulness in the Medicare kickback
statute means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely with the
specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad
purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.”144 The court ratcheted up
from there. It required the government to prove not just that Nora had
purposefully made payments for referrals (as St. Junius requires), but that he
knew the payments were illegal kickbacks.145 On appeal, Nora argued that
he did not act willfully because “while he may have understood that Abide
was making referral payments for new patients, there was no evidence at
trial that proved that he knew these payments constituted unlawful
kickbacks.”146 The Fifth Circuit agreed.147 After cataloging the evidence

contextualizing the evidence and testimony. For this reason, appellate courts typically defer to jury
verdicts, as a jury is best positioned to weigh the evidence, assess witness credibility, and resolve
questions of fact. The Fifth Circuit’s decision to take Nora’s case from the jury on evidentiary
grounds—i.e., that the evidence was insufficient to establish willfulness—is peculiar. See United States
v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 747 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding a rational juror could find that defendants who
monitored referrals, tracked patients and billings, and paid referral fees had acted willfully under the
AKS). The factual gymnastics the court performed, coupled with its reformulation of willfulness,
suggests that the result in Nora is perhaps best explained by the court’s desire to reach what it felt
would be a fair outcome. As the court noted, Nora was just twenty-two when he got mixed up in the
scheme; he had limited formal education; and he did not draw an exorbitant salary. Nor did he profit
or benefit from the fraud, other than perhaps retaining his job. His situation contrasts with Abide’s
owner and the company’s physicians, each of whom had strong financial incentives to maximize the
fraud. Thus, one way to read Nora is as an attempt to do rough justice by preventing a hapless
participant who got little out of the scheme from being held accountable alongside and to the same
extent as those who conceived, drove, and profited from it. Indeed, that the Fifth Circuit severed
Nora’s appeal and considered his case on its own, rather than alongside his co-defendants’ appeals,
lends credence to the conclusion that the court viewed Nora differently and wanted to distinguish his
case from others involved in the conspiracy. United States v. Barnes, 979 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-31074), ECF No. 00515119965 (severing Nora’s case, No. 18-31078, from his co-defendants
in Barnes).
144. Nora, 988 F.3d at 830 (quoting United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 648 (5th Cir. 2019)).
The quoted language once again refers to the Medicare kickback statute, which, as noted, is a misnomer.
The AKS applies to federal health care programs; it is not limited to Medicare. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
145. Nora, 988 F.3d at 831.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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against Nora—his referral payments, proximity to the fraud, and
contributions to ghosting, a practice the court tacitly conceded was
“inherently suspicious”—the court determined that the government had not
proven willfulness.148 It concluded that the evidence against Nora was
insufficient to prove “that Nora knew that Abide’s referral payments
constituted illegal kickbacks.”149
This conclusion puts Nora at odds with St. Junius, which held that
willfulness does not require the government to prove that the defendant
knows that referral payments (commissions in that case) are illegal.150
Without citing or distinguishing its own precedent, the Fifth Circuit
increased the showing required to establish mens rea under the AKS. To
prove that a defendant acts willfully after Nora, the government must
demonstrate that a defendant purposefully pays for referrals knowing that
such payments are illegal kickbacks.151 This showing not only ignores St.
Junius but arguably exceeds the requirements of the AKS.152
The amended AKS provides that “[w]ith respect to violations of this
section, a person need not have actual knowledge of this section or specific
intent to commit a violation of this section.”153 The Fifth Circuit
referenced this statutory language in a single footnote, suggesting that its
holding did not run afoul of the AKS because it did not require Nora to
know of the specific law he had broken.154 The court implied that a
defendant must be aware that his conduct violates a law prohibiting
kickbacks, not necessarily the law that proscribes them.
This distinction is illusory and leads to absurd results if taken literally.
Imagine that a defendant, D3, is an experienced financial fraudster who
decides to look for new moneymaking opportunities. He finds the health
care market attractive, opens a clinic, and promptly enrolls in federal health
care programs. D3 hires a few down-on-their-luck doctors, pays them well,
and instructs them to inflate their bills with extra services they did not
render. The clinic is operating in no time, billing Medicare, Medicaid, and
other federal programs. To gin up more business, D3 electronically transfers
money to third parties in exchange for patient referrals to his new venture.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 832.
Id. at 834.
United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 210–11 (5th Cir. 2013).
Nora, 988 F.3d at 830.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h).
Nora, 988 F.3d at 830 n.3.
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He believes that the referral payments are illegal because they constitute
felony wire fraud transactions but is ignorant of the prohibition against
kickbacks, as he is brand new to health care scams. Using the logic that the
Fifth Circuit applied in Nora, D3 cannot be convicted of violating the AKS
because he did not know that the “referral payments constituted illegal
kickbacks,”155 which is the level of mens rea that the court demanded that
the government attain. This cannot be what Congress intended when it
modified the AKS in 2010, and it is surely more than the Fifth Circuit
required in St. Junius.156
To show that a defendant knows “referral payments constituted illegal
kickbacks,”157 as Nora demands, the government must now prove (1) a
defendant is aware that it is illegal to give or take remuneration in exchange
for patient referrals, and (2) intentionally makes or accepts the payments
despite that knowledge.158 This formulation presupposes that a defendant
knows what kickbacks are, knows they are illegal, and intends to violate
whatever law prohibits them. About the only things that the government
does not have to prove after Nora is that the defendant knows that the law
criminalizing kickbacks is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b or that it is
referred to as the AKS. If this is now the state of the Fifth Circuit’s
willfulness jurisprudence, how is this any different in substance from
requiring the government to prove knowledge of the AKS and intent to
violate it—the very same showing that Congress rejected when it amended
the AKS in 2010? The Fifth Circuit could and should have devoted more
than two sentences in a passing footnote to reconcile its holding with
subsection (h) of the AKS.
IV. THE AKS AND WILLFULNESS GOING FORWARD
What does it take to violate the AKS in the Fifth Circuit? The answer
depends on which appellate panel one asks. The court has articulated at
least three different standards of willfulness in AKS cases, leaving trial
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, juries, regulators, health care
155. Id. at 834.
156. As an aside, if either the broad willfulness standard articulated in St. Junius or the
intermediate standard embraced in Davis applied, D3 could be convicted of violating the AKS because
he purposefully paid for patient referrals, which satisfies the former standard, and he acted with a bad
purpose to violate the law, which meets the latter (it just happens that he thought he was violating a
different law). See cases cited infra notes 160, 163.
157. Nora, 988 F.3d at 834.
158. Id. at 831, 834.
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providers, and the entire medical field without firm guidance about the level
of intent required to violate the law. The court’s latest foray into willfulness,
a “notoriously malleable word”159 to be sure, does not help matters any.
The law is as disarrayed as ever. The following summarizes potentially
viable formulations of willfulness and the pros and cons of each:
The broad standard. The broad standard, embodied in St. Junius, focuses on
whether the defendant knowingly and willfully pays or receives
remuneration to induce or in return for patient referrals.160 The emphasis
is on whether the act is deliberate, purposeful, or intentional, as opposed to
involuntary, inadvertent, or unconscious. It is immaterial whether a
defendant knows that a referral payment is illegal.161 “All that is required
for criminal liability is proof that the alleged wrongdoer knew what he or
she was doing and was acting on his or her own volition.”162 The primary
virtue of this approach is that it is easy to articulate, understand, and
administer. It reduces complexity in kickback cases by eliminating
intractable inquiries into the state of a defendant’s knowledge of the law and
intent to violate it. Also, it precludes ignorance of the law as a defense to
prosecution. The downside, and it is considerable, is the risk that innocent
actors may run afoul of the AKS given the nuances of modern health care
economics, transactions, relationships, and regulations. While prosecutorial
discretion still exists to differentiate inadvertent violations from culpable
transgressions warranting prosecution, this safeguard is at best cold comfort
to those who are subject to the AKS and its strictures.
The intermediate standard. The intermediate standard reflected in Davis and
its progeny requires general knowledge of illegality and intent to do
something unlawful but does not demand express awareness of the law or a
specific intent to violate it.163 The advantage of this standard is that it
reflects the majority approach in the circuit courts and has a developed body
of caselaw standing behind it.164 Decisions like St. Junius and Nora are, at
159. United States v. Bryan, 524 U.S. 184, 202 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 211 (5th Cir. 2013).
161. Id. at 210.
162. Davies, supra note 28, at 406–07 n.254 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. S16307-01 (1986)).
Davies quotes Senator Carl Levin’s statements about the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, a distinct
kickback law related to federal government contracting. 132 CONG. REC. S16307-01 (1986). While
Senator Levin’s comments address kickbacks in a different statutory context, his formulation of the
willfulness standard aptly describes the broad formulation articulated in St. Junius. St. Junius, 739 F.3d
at 210–11.
163. United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998).
164. DeGraw, supra note 32, at 279–80, 287.
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least in the Fifth Circuit, outliers. This standard also offers some protection
against innocent violations of the AKS that a prosecutor might not screen
out under the broad standard. While the intermediate formulation may be
rhetorically familiar, its application is anything but uniform. This Article
suggests that, at least in some instances, how courts articulate and apply
willfulness depends as much on the outcome judges desire as the precise
wording of either the AKS or the cases construing it. In addition, as
Justice Scalia sketched in his Bryan dissent, it is difficult to ascertain what
general knowledge of illegality means.165 Does a defendant who bribes
doctors for referrals act willfully if, although ignorant of the AKS, she
knowingly uses embezzled funds to pay the kickbacks? What if, as
Justice Scalia posited, she illegally double-parks her car while delivering the
illicit payments? Suppose instead of paying bribes she accepts them
knowing that she will not report her ill-gotten gains on her federal income
tax return. Is her knowing receipt of cash and intent to flout the internal
revenue laws enough general knowledge and criminal intent to establish
willfulness under the AKS? The intermediate standard does not answer
these questions, leaving judges with “no principled way to determine what
law the defendant must be conscious of violating.”166
The stringent standard. The stringent standard announced in Hanlester and
rekindled in Nora sets the highest bar for the government. It requires proof
that a defendant knows that referral payments are illegal kickbacks and
intends to make or receive them anyway.167 This standard maximizes
protection for innocent defendants, negating the government’s ability to
prove willfulness based on generalized evidence that “everybody knows”
The government must instead elicit
misconduct is occurring.168
particularized evidence of knowledge and intent even if, as the Fifth Circuit
suggests, it need not show literal awareness of the AKS and specific
intention to violate it.169 This is, as noted, a questionable assertion. The
upshot of Nora is that the government must prove that a defendant knows
referral payments are illegal kickbacks and means to pay them; realistically,
this is tantamount to requiring the government to establish specific
knowledge and criminal intent. Compelling the government to prove that
the defendant intends to make referral payments knowing that they are
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
United States v. Bryan, 524 U.S. 184, 203 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Nora, 988 F.3d 823, 832 (5th Cir. 2021).
Id.
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illegal kickbacks is, in substance, no different than requiring it to show that
the defendant knows of the AKS and intends to violate it. The Fifth
Circuit’s parsing of willfulness looks suspiciously like the Ninth Circuit’s
formulation in Hanlester. This conclusion points to the downside of the
stringent standard, which is that it puts many culpable kickback defendants
beyond prosecutorial reach and sanctions ignorance of the law as a defense
to accountability.170
For all the uncertainty Nora engenders, the decision does make one thing
certain: the government and defendants will continue to tussle over the
meaning of willfully in kickback cases. Rather than move the law toward a
clearer, firmer exposition of what it means to “knowingly and willfully”
offer, pay, solicit, or receive kickbacks to induce or in return for patient
referrals, the Fifth Circuit has made the law even more opaque. The court
ignored circuit precedent, failed to reckon with relevant statutory language,
and announced a more demanding mens rea than law or precedent justify.
This contributes to “wide uncertainty about the law’s commands. It is now
harder than ever to know whether knowledge of the law will or will not be
an element, and if it will, precisely what the prosecutor’s burden as to that
element will be.”171
This is a regrettable outcome, particularly in the Fifth Circuit. Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi—the three states that comprise the Fifth
Circuit—are home to three Health Care Fraud Strike Forces, situated in
Dallas, Houston, and along the Gulf Coast.172 Strike Forces are interagency
teams that concentrate the federal government’s law enforcement assets—
prosecutors, agents, auditors, and others—where health care fraud, waste,
and abuse are rampant.173 The AKS is among their most important and
effective tools. The decision in Nora makes the struggle against health care
fraud that much more difficult for these elite enforcement units by
perpetuating ambiguity and raising the government’s burden in kickback
cases beyond what the AKS and precedent require. The decision also

170. See Davies, supra note 28, at 346–47 (observing that “ignorance or mistake of law has
already become an acceptable excuse in a number of regulatory and nonregulatory settings, particularly
in prosecutions brought under statutes requiring proof of ‘willful’ conduct on the part of the accused”).
171. Id. at 413.
172. Strike Force Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/strike-force-operations [https://perma.cc/X3DZ-V2HL] (EP).
173. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 1, 8, 10 (2020),
https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY2019-hcfac.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8GW-8AD2].
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revitalizes ignorance of the law as a defense and emboldens fraudsters. If
someone who shunts patients to “friendly” doctors after their own doctors
have said they do not need services, who tracks referrals and pays kickbacks
to keep them coming, and who helps obscure the fraud scheme from
detection by arranging for patients to disappear from Medicare’s payrolls
can get off for lack of willfulness because he does not know his conduct is
illegal, then anybody can. That is the unfortunate message that Nora sends
to parties within and without the Fifth Circuit.
Congress ideally should rectify this problem by clarifying once more what,
if any, knowledge and intent prosecutors must prove to establish willfulness
in AKS cases. A legislative fix is a pipedream at present. It thus falls to the
Fifth Circuit itself to clean up the jurisprudential mess by selecting one
willfulness standard, articulating it with as much precision as possible, and
policing adherence through careful and consistent appellate review. In some
ways, the selection and coherent use of a single standard—any standard—
will be better than the judicial clutter that currently exists. While the broad
and intermediate formulations of willfulness discussed in this Article are
more consonant with the text and history of the AKS than the stringent
formulation approximated in Nora, what is most important is that the court
picks an interpretive lane and stays in it.
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